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[This is a pre-proofs version of an introduction to a special edition of the Journal of 
International Political Theory. In order to cite, please use the published version, which is 
here: http://ipt.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/02/16/1755088216630997.abstract?rss=1] 
 
Consider the following three ‘growth areas’ in political theory: (1) ‘Global justice’; (2) ‘just 
war’; and (3) the non-identical twins of realism/moralism and ideal/non-ideal theory. What 
instantly strikes one here? The fact that whilst the first two are incredibly ambitious research 
programmes, in terms of the gap between theoretical prescription and political reality, the 
third worries about that precise gap. And there is a lot of worrying about that gap.  Right 
now, and regardless of the precise question posed and terminology invoked, it is hard to think 
of a more ‘live’ and varied conversation than the one that is currently going on about how 
ideal or pessimistic, how moralising or realistic, or how abstract or practical, political theory 
ought to be (Estlund, 2009; Farrelly, 2007; Geuss, 2008; Sen, 2011; Waldron, 2013; and 
Williams, 2005. For overarching discussion, see Rossi & Sleat, 2014; and Valentini, 2012)
1
. 
Or at least, it is hard to think of a more excited conversation apart from those other two 
‘growth areas’ just mentioned, which not only seem to have missed the ‘are we realistic 
enough?’ memo, but which also no doubt retain such excitement, at least in part, as a result of 
having done so. 
 
With this in mind, it is time for us to think more about how realistic or otherwise we ought to 
be in the specific world of ‘international’ or ‘global’ political theory where, after all, theories 
of ‘just war’ and ‘global justice’ reside. Is this a domain in which the problems discussed 
within the moralism/realism and ideal/non-ideal theory debates apply to the same degree as 
‘domestic’ political theory? Are they felt with greater force? Or do a different set of problems 
apply, either instead or in parallel? This is what we hope to explore in the following 
collection, by way of a set of responses to these and yet further questions, each of which 
brings together the methodological angst of the aforementioned ‘how to do political theory’ 
debates with the high moralising ambition of, say, theories of global justice. 
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 There are also three key collections on the topic: A special edition of Social Theory and Practice, 34:3 (2008), 
a special edition of the European Journal of Political Theory, 9:4 (2010); and (Floyd & Stears, 2011). Note that 
by implying that these debates overlap, which they do, I am not saying that they are identical. Realists in 
particular are keen to stress the distinctiveness of their concerns – see (Rossi & Sleat, 2014). My earliest 
thoughts on the ‘new’ realism can be found in (Floyd, 2010). 
These responses run as follows – and bear in mind that they are gathered in no particular 
order here, with the exception of David Miller’s contribution, which takes its lead, in part, 
from the contributions that precede it. First, Mathias Risse explores several different 
conceptions of political philosophy with a view to figuring out just what the point is of 
writing books on, specifically, ‘global justice’. Second, Aaron James affirms what many take 
to be the limited relevance of principled arguments, of the kind pursued in political theory, 
and including ‘global’ political theory, to the ‘real-world’ processes of public political 
argument and policy-formation. Third, Terry MacDonald explores the responsiveness of 
normative political principles to social facts, with specific reference to the justification and 
design of international institutions. Fourth, I explore the relevance to global political theory 
of a new idea regarding the justification of political principles – ‘normative behaviourism’ – 
which works by looking for patterns, not in what I call our ‘normative thoughts’ (e.g. 
intuitions, considered judgements, hypothetical choices), but rather in our behaviour in 
response to particular political institutions.  
 
Fifth, Matt Sleat explores, with much of the debate about contemporary realism in mind, the 
idea of global justice as a specifically ‘political’ value. Sixth, Chris Bertram distinguishes 
between principle-based, model-based and realist approaches to justice, again with reference 
to institutions, and wonders whether it is possible to have a non-institutional account of 
justice at all. Seventh, Shmulik Nili makes the case that we ought to be more focused on real-
world moral failures in our theorising, and also more informed by contemporary social-
science, whilst acknowledging the limits of the latter. And finally, eighth, David Miller 
distinguishes between different kinds of political realism, before arguing that the domestic 
domain differs significantly from the international one when it comes to principles and their 
justification, specifically in terms of the problems of agency and legitimacy that confront 
anyone wanting to do political theory at that level, whether we call such theory ‘realist’ or 
not.  
 
So, to repeat: we currently have a situation in which some of us worry about how realistic 
political theory ought to be, whilst others, particularly at the international or global level, 
pursue (what many consider to be) some of the most unrealistic political theory seen for some 
time (though of course, one could say as much for some strands of e.g. ‘republican’ or ‘luck-
egalitarian’ theory). Is there a tension here? Or are these complementary activities, as 
suggested, say, by the ideal/non-ideal division of labour? Again, we hope to shed light on 
such things in this collection. And so, as a result, regardless of whether one sees the recent 
worrying about idealism and realism as a sign of political ambition (we want to be more 
relevant!), philosophical curiosity (we haven’t thought much about this before), or even a 
crisis of confidence (is there any point to what we’re doing?), there is surely something for all 
appetites here. Naturally though, the (realistic!) hope in all this is not for finality, in the sense 
of settling such matters, but rather only for an open-ended contribution to our knowledge of 
them, the surest sign of which is always as follows: in response to the tentative answers 
provided from here on in, new questions are triggered further down the line. 
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